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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the idea that individuals have a moral and 
constitutional right of control over the use of their thoughts vis-à-vis the 
state.  As a point of departure, I consider the prospect of a forensic 
neuroimaging device that was capable of eliciting recall and recognition 
from a criminal suspect without the suspect’s having even to answer an 
interrogator’s question.  Reflection on government access to this sort of 
interrogation technique suggests that the state should be prohibited from 
either extracting a person’s thoughts without her consent or making use 
of her compelled thoughts to lay criminal blame upon her.   
Though neither judges nor scholars have defended this account of 
the right to silence in explicit terms, the notion of “mental control” I 
shall develop here underlies much that is assumed about the relation 
 
∗  Instructor in Bioethics and Law, Yale University; J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, 2010; D.Phil, 
University of Oxford, 2007; A.B, Harvard College, 2004.  Thanks to Jane Moriarty and the 
University of Akron School of Law for inviting me to contribute to this symposium issue, and to the 
participants of the Akron Neuroscience, Law & Government Symposium for trenchant discussion.  
I’m grateful to Jason Fuller and the editors of Akron Law Review for guiding this piece to 
publication.  I owe a special debt to my professor Alex Stein, who made criminal procedure come 
alive and who taught me much of what I have written here. 
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between the Fifth Amendment and the values of freedom and privacy. 
Advances in cognitive science and neurotechnology, by promising the 
acquisition of incriminating information from a person’s brain in a way 
that avoids traditional concerns about physical or psychological harm, 
bring the moral and legal significance of mental control into sharp relief. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I briefly lays out the 
normative stakes and shows why existing accounts of the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination are ill-equipped to address the moral 
and legal implications of safe and reliable forensic neuroscience.  Part II 
argues that brain imaging is importantly different, for Fifth Amendment 
purposes, from all other forms of evidence, such as speaking, writing, 
and nodding;1 photographic and video evidence;2 DNA, fingerprint and 
breathalyzer tests;3 hair, saliva, and blood samples;4 voice and 
handwriting exemplars for identification;5 appearance in a lineup6 or 
wearing certain clothing;7 and even polygraph tests.8  What makes brain 
imaging unique is that it enables state officials to obtain information 
directly from a suspect’s brain, in a way that affords her no opportunity 
to control the transmission of that information. 
Part III examines the doctrinal distinction between “testimonial” 
evidence, which is privileged by the Self Incrimination Clause, and 
“physical” evidence, which is not.  Three elements—compulsion, 
incrimination, and testimony—must be present to trigger Fifth 
Amendment protection.9  Since brain imaging could straightforwardly 
 
 1. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763. 
 2. See, e.g., People v. Hines, 938 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1997) (videos); Edwards v. Butler, 882 F.2d 
160 (5th Cir. 1989) (photographs). 
 3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v Santana-Lopez, 613 N.W. 2d 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (DNA); 
People v. Shaw, 531 N.E.2d 650, 651 (1988) (breathalyzer); Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 
1979) (breathalyzer). 
 4. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757; State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27 (Wash. 2007) (saliva). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice); United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218 (1967) (voice); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (handwriting); United States v. 
Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting); United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (handwriting); 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting). 
 6. See, e.g., Wade, 388 U.S. at 218; see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764, 764 n.8 (affirming 
that Fifth Amendment does not protect against incriminating compulsion “to stand, to assume a 
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture”). 
 7. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910). 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (holding that a per se exclusion 
of polygraph evidence in a military court does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense). 
 9. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).  In addition to the compulsion, 
incrimination, and testimony elements, a Fifth Amendment case must also arise under a matter of 
criminal law.  See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003).  Therefore, the privilege does 
2
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qualify as both compelled and incriminating, as in the India murder case 
above, the critical question is whether it counts as “testimonial.”10  This 
Part argues that the Supreme Court counts evidence as “testimonial” 
only when it conveys a suspect’s intention to communicate her 
thoughts.11  The Court’s traditional understanding of this distinction 
likely leaves a suspect without constitutional protection against the use 
of compelled brain imaging to extract incriminating information from 
her brain. 
Part IV argues that the physical/testimonial distinction presupposes 
a flawed conception of mind/body dualism.12  Exposing this dualism 
reveals the normative significance we confer to a suspect’s control over 
his thoughts against unwanted use by the government.  It is for this 
reason that the constitutional right to silence protects against involuntary 
disclosures of knowledge or understandings from an unwilling suspect 
for use in criminal prosecution against him.  The use of compelled 
neuroscientific evidence is illegitimate when it deprives the accused of 
control over her mental life.  This suggests that defendants may opt for 
brain imaging to exculpate themselves, but that prosecutors may not 
comment on a suspect’s decision to decline the testing, and that judges 
should instruct jurors not to draw adverse inferences from a choice to 
decline the testing. 
II.  THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Imagine a safe, painless, and non-invasive interrogation device that 
could ascertain thoughts and memories from an uncooperative suspect 
with virtually 100% precision.  Would the use of this incriminating 
information to prosecute the suspect violate his right to silence?13  The 
prospect of reliable truth detection is, to date, an unqualified fiction, 
since even the most sophisticated technologies remain largely untested 
 
not apply when the compelled information would lead to exclusively non-criminal sanctions, such 
as the loss of a job or a license. 
 10. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966). 
 11. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990). 
 12. See Charles B. Nemeroff et al., Editorial, Functional Brain Imaging: Twenty-First 
Century Phrenology or Psychobiological Advance for the Millennium? 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
671, 672 (1999) (“Neuroimaging offers a powerful probe of brain state, but we are now faced with 
metaphysical questions; i.e., what is a brain state, and how is it related to the outward manifestations 
of behavior?  This has the potential for degenerating into the old mind-body duality of Descartes . . . 
.”). 
 13. See Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal 
and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, 
MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114, 146 (Brian Garland ed., 2004). 
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and prone to error.  But advances in cognitive neuroscience, which make 
it possible to measure the properties and processes of the brain in high-
resolution imagery, invite us to consider this question.  Brain imaging 
test results were admitted into evidence in a recent murder case in India. 
In June 2008, police in Maharashtra, India took 24-year-old 
student Aditi Sharma into custody as a suspect in the murder of her 
former fiancé, Udit Bharati.14  Sharma and Bharati had been living 
together in Pune when Sharma met another man and eloped with him to 
Delhi.  The following year, Sharma returned to Pune, where, according 
to prosecutors, she asked Bharati to meet her at a McDonald’s and 
laced his food with arsenic.  Bharati died from the poisoning.  Sharma 
insisted she was innocent. 
Police read Sharma her rights and asked her to sit for a brain 
imaging test.  Sharma agreed to the test.  Officers strapped her onto a 
high-tech gurney and fastened 32 electrodes to her head.  The sensors 
measured electrical brainwaves in response to targeted stimuli.  
Investigators read Sharma first-person statements that corresponded to 
their theory of the crime, as well as neutral statements to help the 
software distinguish between Sharma’s actual remembrance and her 
normal cognition.  Sharma said nothing in reply, but the sensors were 
able to measure and display her brainwave patterns to confirm that she 
knew some of the statements were true and that some were false. 
“I bought arsenic,” they said.  And, “I met Udit at McDonald’s.”  
For an hour, Sharma did nothing.  But the parts of her brain where 
memories are thought to be stored lit up on the screen when she heard 
these statements.  At the murder trial, the brain scans were admitted into 
evidence.  These neuroscientific test results persuaded Judge S.S. 
Phansalkar-Joshi that Sharma had “experiential knowledge” of having 
committed the murder.  Sharma was convicted and sentenced to life in 
prison.15 
Assume, for the sake of argument, that the brain imaging technique 
used in this case was highly reliable.  Many people may nevertheless 
think that police committed a grave moral and legal wrong by coercing 
the disclosure of Sharma’s thoughts.16  The Supreme Court has 
 
 14. See Anand Giridharadas, Brain Scan a New Wave in Criminal Evidence, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Sept. 8, 2008, at 1; Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts is 
Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at A8. 
 15. See supra note 14. 
 16. See Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection 
and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 359, 371 (2007) (“[D]irect and unwanted 
government access to our mental life is a chilling concept.”). 
4
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speculated that the involuntary transmission of incriminating lie-
detection evidence would violate a suspect’s right to silence.17  “To 
compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to 
determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, 
whether willed or not,” Justice Brennan wrote in dicta for a 5-4 majority 
in the 1966 case of Schmerber v. California,18 “is to evoke the spirit and 
history of the Fifth Amendment.”19  Although the compelled-response 
standard that Justice Brennan gestured toward in Schmerber was not 
binding then, and is not applied by courts today, its widespread appeal 
and influence remains.20  Presuming that neuroscience test results were 
sufficiently reliable, however, existing accounts of the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination provide no support for Justice Brennan’s 
reflections.  This mismatch between right-to-silence principles, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, widely held intuitions that the Fifth 
Amendment should protect against compelled brain imaging, is the 
anomaly that propels this inquiry into the implications of forensic 
neuroscience for the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
Justification for the right to silence is fraught with murkiness.  
Many have observed an “ambiguous and sometimes contradictory 
picture of the reasons underlying the Fifth Amendment’s enactment.”21  
The privilege against compelled self-incrimination has origins as a 
safeguard against government abuses such as the Roman Inquisition, 
Star Chamber, and ex officio oaths of the ecclesiastical courts, long 
forsaken in the modern judiciary.22  Commentators have referred to the 
 
 17. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
V. 
 18. 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
 19. Id.  
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 
20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 36 (1982) (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968)); E.M. Morgan, The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949); R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and 
Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 
(1935)); see also R.H. Helmholz, Introduction, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: 
ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (R.H. Helmholz et al. eds., 1997) (“Despite its reputation as a 
foundation stone of common law jurisprudence, . . . the privilege as we know it is actually the 
product of relatively recent choice.”) (citations omitted). 
 22. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956); Muniz, 496 U.S. at 595-98; Doe 
v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988); see generally Frank Riebli, The Spectre of Star 
Chamber: The Role of an Ancient English Tribunal in the Supreme Court’s Self-Incrimination 
Jurisprudence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 807 (2002). 
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privilege as “schizophrenic,”23 an “unsolved riddle of vast proportions, a 
Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights”24 that is incapable of 
“be[ing] squared with any rational theory.”25  Even the Supreme Court 
has conceded that while the right to silence is “an expression of the 
moral striving of the community[,] . . . a reflection of our common 
conscience,”26 it remains unclear “just what it is supposed to do or just 
whom it is intended to protect.”27 
Scholars and judges have articulated a number of ways to justify 
the right to silence.  Five are most prominent and compelling: (1) non-
reliance on presumptively unreliable evidence28 which “the accused 
reasonably believes . . . is within his power to affect the probative value 
of the evidence sought;”29 (2) preservation of the credibility of innocent 
defendants;30 (3) protection of innocents who fear poor performance on 
cross-examination;31 (4) pardon of suspects who make a reasonable 
decision to lie in their own defense,32 and (5) what scholars have called 
the “original American justification”33—avoidance of the “cruel 
trilemma” that forces a suspect to choose among self-accusation, 
contempt of court, and perjury.34  Assuming that neuroforensic 
technology was sufficiently reliable, however, none of these ways of 
 
 23. Stephen J. Shulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 
VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 311 (1992). 
 24. Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995). 
 25. William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1988). 
 26. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1964) (quoting DEAN ERWIN GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT TODAY 73 (1955)). 
 27. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964) (quoting 
Harry Kalven, Jr., Invoking the Fifth Amendment—Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 
BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 181, 182 (1953)). 
 28. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 24. 
 29. B. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination: Extorting 
Physical Evidence from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 598 (1970) (arguing that the Self-
Incrimination Clause protects against psychologically intrusive compulsion of evidence). 
 30. See Daniel J. Seidman & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000). 
 31. See Craig M. Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All These Years, 79 MICH. 
L. REV. 1290, 1294 (1981) (arguing that innocent defendants may choose not to testify at trial to 
avoid adverse inferences on cross-examination as a result of anxiety, confusion, or prior 
convictions). 
 32. Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1228-29. 
 33. See William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
813, 843 (2005); see also Peter Westen & Stewart Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The 
Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the “Preferred Response,” 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521, 535-
40 (1982). 
 34. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).  See also Chavez 
v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990). 
6
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thinking about the privilege would bar the compelled use of certain brain 
imaging techniques to extort information from a criminal suspect’s 
brain.35 
Consider the implications of reliable brain imaging evidence for 
each of the justifications above.  (1) Reliability concerns fall away with 
an accurate brain imaging technique because “an effective and reliable 
lie detector test deprives the individual of any opportunity to deceive the 
questioner.”36  (2) Anxiety about the integrity of statements made by 
innocent defendants is put to rest by an assurance that brain imaging 
could accurately detect memories and capture truthfulness.  (3) There 
would be no reason to worry about innocent defendants getting flustered 
by skillful prosecutors when neither the subject nor the examiner 
exercised any control over the results of the test.  (4) Nor would the 
excuse theory have protected the suspect Sharma because “there [was] 
no falsehood to excuse and therefore no need to immunize 
noncooperation.”37  (5) And since neuroscience techniques could reliably 
access Sharma’s responses in the absence of her participation, police 
were able to obtain the incriminating information without her being put 
to any choice among indictment, contempt, and perjury.  So there was no 
threat that Sharma would incur the psychological cruelty thought to 
accompany a decision about whether to consent to her own punishment. 
If we nonetheless recoil from the use of neurotechnology to extract 
thoughts from an unwilling suspect, it will not do simply to affirm that 
involuntary brain imaging “shocks the conscience” much like the 
stomach pumping in Rochin v. California.38  Alternatively, we could 
shake off our disquiet as so much confusion and try to fit forensic 
neuroscience into the existing jurisprudence.  Some scholars apply 
common law distinctions to argue that brain imaging techniques are 
unlikely to qualify for Fifth Amendment protection,39 while others make 
the case that compelled neuroforensics could be readily protected by 
reference to the line of right-to-silence opinions in the wake of 
 
 35. See Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 
33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 333 (2006). 
 36. Arenella, supra note 21, at 44-45 n.70. 
 37. Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1276. 
 38. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).  See Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of 
Interrogation Jurisprudence, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 341, 353 (2007). 
 39. See Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 16, at 369 (“[I]f control over results is a defining element 
of a testimonial act, brain fingerprinting would not qualify as such.”); Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin 
Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L & 
CRIMINOLOGY 243, 246 (2004) (providing a theory of the Self-Incrimination Clause that protects the 
“substantive content of cognition”). 
7
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Schmerber.40  No matter how descriptive or predictive these approaches 
prove, as a matter of doctrine they remain morally unsatisfying to the 
extent that they are “not normative or justificatory.”41  Explanatory 
theories might account for Fifth Amendment doctrine in a convincing 
way, but because they accept extant case law as legitimate and fixed, 
their understanding of the right to silence must be tailored to capture 
even anomalous or undesirable holdings.  Yet the possibility that reliable 
brain imaging would be admitted in the courtroom invites us to rethink 
prevailing understandings of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. 
III.  COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE 
Attempts to detect lies in criminal suspects date back thousands of 
years.42  In 900 B.C., Hindu interrogators sought to identify deceitful 
behavior in criminal suspects by looking for physiological markers—
cagey movements, facial discoloration, or “speak[ing] nonsense, 
rub[bing] the great toe along the ground, and shiver[ing]”—that were 
thought to correspond to a deceitful state of mind.43  Centuries later, the 
ordeals of Christian Europe sought to expose the guilty through 
supernatural intervention that rarely saved the accused from hot irons, 
boiling water, or drowning.44  Nineteenth-century Europe and the United 
States saw the rise of phrenology to detect honest or deceptive character 
by measuring the shape and contours of a subject’s head.45  Brain 
imaging heralds a step in this project. 
Contrary to some media portrayals,46 neurotechnologies cannot read 
minds.47  Even the most advanced devices are not capable of 
 
 40. George M. Dery, Lying Eyes: Constitutional Implications of New Thermal Imaging Lie 
Detection Technology, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 217, 248 (2004) (drawing on dicta in Schmerber to argue 
that the use of involuntarily transmitted information to incriminate a suspect in a criminal trial is 
“squarely within the scope of the Fifth Amendment[,]” while noting, however, that “Justice 
Brennan’s ruminations on lie detectors” were not within the Court’s holding) (citation omitted).  
Ronald Allen and Kristin Mace take a similar approach.  Allen & Mace, supra note 39. 
 41. Allen & Mace, supra note 39, at 248. 
 42. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of 
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1166 (1993). 
 43. Paul V. Trovillo, History of Lie Detection, 29 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 848, 849 
(1939). 
 44. See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE  L.J. 575, 585-86 (1997). 
 45. See Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 880 (1997). 
 46. See, e.g., Jerry Adler, Mind Reading, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 2004, at 42, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/54762 (regarding fMRI lie detection); Dennis O’Brien, Mind 
Readers: Scanning Technology Promises to Map the Brain’s Pathways, but Some Fear Its Ability to 
Expose a Patient’s Secrets and Lies, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 10, 2004, at 1E. 
8
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ascertaining a subject’s moral beliefs, religious convictions, or 
aspirations for the future.48  Nor can they establish any objective fact 
about some state of affairs in the world.49  What brain imaging promises, 
instead, is to determine a subject’s sensory recall or perceived 
recognition—what a subject believes he saw, heard, or knows—about a 
particular set of facts or about the state of past events.50  In a landmark 
2002 study, Dr. Daniel Langleben and colleagues asked participants in a 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study to conceal the identity of a 
five of clubs, while images of different playing cards appeared on the 
screen along with the question whether the featured card was the one in 
the subjects’ hand.51  Langleben and colleagues found conspicuous 
differences between patterns of brain activity when subjects truthfully 
denied having other cards and when they falsely denied having the five 
of clubs.52  Subsequent studies successfully replicated Langleben’s 
results.53  Further investigation has determined that truthful behavior, 
because it is spontaneously facilitated, requires less cognitive control 
and the use of fewer brain regions (primarily the hippocampus and left 
prefrontal cortex, which store and regulate memory) than does deceptive 
behavior, which utilizes greater cognitive control in discrete premotor 
brain regions to produce the inhibitory feedback and conscious 
calculation necessary to generate new (false) “memories.”54 
 
 47. See O’Brien, supra note 46. 
 48. See Donald Kennedy, Neuroimaging: Revolutionary Research Tool or a Post-Modern 
Phrenology?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 19 (2005). 
 49. As Martha J. Farah and Paul Root Wolpe put it: “Although brainwaves do not lie, neither 
do they tell the truth; they are simply measures of brain activity.”  Martha J. Farah & Paul Root 
Wolpe, Monitoring and Manipulating Brain Function: New Neuroscience Technologies and Their 
Ethical Implications, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2004, at 35, 40. 
 50. See Craig E.L. Stark & Larry R. Squire, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
Activity in the Hippocampal Region During Recognition Memory, 20 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7776, 7776 
(2000); John D.E. Gabrieli, Functional Neuroimaging of Episodic Memory, in HANDBOOK OF 
FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING OF COGNITION 262 (Roberto Cabeza & Alan Kingstone eds., 2001). 
 51. See Daniel D. Lengleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-
Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 729 (2002). 
 52. See id. at 731. 
 53. See K. Luan Phan et al., Neural Correlates of Telling Lies: A Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Study at 4 Tesla, 12 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 164, 171 (2005). 
 54. See, e.g., Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with 
Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 262 (2005); Jennifer Marie Nunez et al., 
Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive 
Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267, 267 (2005); F. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men, 16 J. 
NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 295 (2004); Frank Andrew Kozel et al., A 
Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 
(2004); Giorgio Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI 
9
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There are two classes of brain imaging devices that can be used for 
purposes of memory detection.55  The first class seeks to measure blood 
flow patterns in the brain;56 the second measures electrical activity 
patterns in the brain.57  The first class of techniques relies on the fact that 
blood flow in the brain differs when people lie as compared with when 
they tell the truth.58  Blood flow patterns reflect metabolic and 
circulatory adjustment resulting from increased brain activity, 
independent of whether the subject makes any effort to conceal a 
memory.59  Brain imaging techniques take advantage of neural 
differences between truthful and deceptive behavior by measuring how 
much blood is flowing to different parts of the brain in response to 
targeted stimuli.60  The most commonly used method for measuring 
blood flow in the brain, called functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI), uses a powerful magnet to identify changes in blood 
oxygenation that occur when a person performs a mental activity, such 
as viewing an image, answering a question, listening to a voice, or 
telling a story.61  FMRI then projects a graphic representation of brain 
activity with resolution that is an order of magnitude greater than what 
 
Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 836 (2003); Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and 
Functional Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEUROREPORT 2849, 2850 (2001). 
 55. See Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 6, at 47; Joan 
O’C. Hamilton, Journey to the Center of the Mind: ‘Functional’ MRI Is Yielding a Clearer Picture 
of What Thoughts Look Like, BUS. WK., Apr. 19, 2004, at 78; Faye Flam, Your Brain May Soon Be 
Used Against You, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 29, 2002, at A01 
 56. See John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 
CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007); Paul Root Wolpe et al., Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-
Detection: Promises and Perils, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39, 39 (2005); Investigative Techniques—
Federal Agency Views on the Potential Application of “Brain Fingerprinting,” GAO REP. (Rep. No. 
GAO-02-22), Oct. 31, 2001, available at 2001 WL 1560280 
 57. Carter Snead has distinguished “anatomical” neuroimaging techniques (those that are 
“limited to the observation of the brain’s architecture”) from “functional” techniques (those that 
“permit[ ] the construction of computerized images that measure the brain’s activity with varying 
degrees of temporal and anatomical resolution, depending on the technology employed.”).  O. 
Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 
1281 (2007) (citation omitted). 
 58. See Luis Hernandez et al., Temporal Sensitivity of Event-Related fMRI, 17 NEUROIMAGE 
1018, 1025 (2002). 
 59. See Steven D. Forman et al., Improved Assessment of Significant Activation in Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI): Use of a Cluster-Size Threshold, 33 MAGNETIC RESONANCE 
MED. 636 (1995). 
 60. F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 611 (2005). 
 61. See David G. Norris, Principles of Magnetic Resonance Assessment of Brain Function, 23 
J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 794, 794 (2006); RICHARD B. BUXTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 23-45 (2002). 
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was not long ago the most precise brain imaging technology, the 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scan.62 
The reliability of fMRI is not uncontroversial.63  While a private 
company called “No Lie MRI” purports to achieve 90% accuracy in 
detecting deception,64 critics note the low number of research subjects 
studied in widely cited fMRI research experiments.65  Some experts 
suggest that the changes in blood flow that fMRI measures are too small 
to yield any significant information about the content of activity in the 
brain.66  Others argue that increased blood flow could result from 
neurological processes other than efforts to conceal, including a 
subject’s anxiety with the claustrophobic machine or an emotional state 
that is heightened for some other reason unrelated to the cognitive 
processes for which the fMRI tests.67  Still others claim that blood flow 
patterns do not actually signify output activity in the brain at all, but 
rather input activity.68  Furthermore, since the fMRI machine requires 
that a subject’s head remain still for several hours, even a small physical 
movement can impede the scanner’s ability to obtain data on blood flow 
patterns.69  Finally, fMRI may call for voluntary participation from a 
subject who must be willing to answer a question or otherwise register a 
 
 62. See Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling About an 
Ecologically Valid Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation—Initial 
Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679 (2006). 
 63. See Margaret Talbot, Duped, NEW YORKER, June 2, 2007, at 52-61.  
 64. See Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need 
for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 392 (2007) (citing No Lie MRI, Market Opportunities, 
http://www.noliemri.com/investors/MarketOpportunity.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2009)). 
 65. See David I. Donaldson, Parsing Brain Activity with fMRI and Mixed Designs: What Kind 
of a State is Neuroimaging in?, 27 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES 442 (2004). 
 66. See Sandra Blakeslee, Just What’s Going On Inside that Head of Yours?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2000, at F6. 
 67. Orrin Devinsky and Mark D’Esposito explain: 
When a subject performs a task during imaging, it is difficult to demonstrate 
conclusively that he or she is differentially engaging a single, identified cognitive 
process.  The subject may engage in unwanted cognitive processes that either have no 
overt, measurable effects or are perfectly confounded with the process of interest.  
Consequently, the neural activity measured by the functional neuroimaging technique 
may result from some confounding neural computation that is itself not necessary for 
executing the cognitive process under study. 
ORRIN DEVINSKY & MARK D’ESPOSITO, NEUROLOGY OF COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL 
DISORDERS 53-54 (Oxford U.P. 2003). 
 68. See Sandie Cleland, What Does fMRI Actually Measure?, 17 PSYCHOLOGIST 388 (2004). 
 69. See Randy L. Buckner & Jessica M. Logan, Functional Neuroimaging Methods: PET and 
fMRI, in HANDBOOK OF FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING OF COGNITION 28, 30 (Robert Cabeza & 
Alan Kingstone eds., 2001). 
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response to specific stimuli.70  For the second class of 
neurotechnologies, however, there is no need for a subject’s cooperation 
in order to acquire information from his or her brain.71 
This second class of technologies relies on the fact that every piece 
of information in a person’s brain is stored by specific neurons, which 
fire when the brain recognizes that information, producing electrical 
activity.72  This electrical activity is a direct measure of information-
processing in the brain.73  Neurotechnologies can measure these 
electrical brainwaves through the use of electroencephalographic (EEG) 
sensors attached to the scalp.74  By measuring electrical brainwaves in 
response to targeted stimuli, the EEG technique, also known as “brain 
fingerprinting,” can ascertain the presence or absence of information in a 
subject’s brain, thereby confirming or denying the subject’s familiarity 
with a particular event or image, such as a photograph of a crime scene, 
victim’s face, or murder weapon under investigation.75  Other 
neuroimaging techniques within this second class, including functional 
near-infrared light technology (fNIR), which reflects infrared light off 
the frontal cortex,76 and thermographic technology, which detects heat 
emanating from the skin of the face,77 are less reliable than EEG. 
Brain fingerprinting suffers from limited testing outside of the 
laboratory78 as well as empirical shortcomings, including the risk of false 
negative and false positive results.79  Because the EEG sensors measure 
electrical activity associated with recognition, the subject needs to have 
retained the targeted information in his or her brain for brain 
fingerprinting to work.80  If the subject has experience with the targeted 
 
 70. See Scott M. Hayes et al., An fMRI Study of Episodic Memory: Retrieval of Object, 
Spatial, and Temporal Information, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 885, 886 (2004). 
 71. See Jonathan Knight, The Truth About Lying, 428 NATURE 692, 692-94 (2004). 
 72. See Kenneth R. Foster et al., Bioethics and the Brain, 40 IEEE SPECTRUM 34, 36 (2003). 
 73. See Helen Pearson, Lure of Lie Detectors Spooks Ethicists, 441 NATURE 918, 918-19 
(2006). 
 74. Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Scientific Procedure, Research, and Applications, 
http://www.brainwavescience.com/TechnologyOverview.php (last visited July 29, 2008). 
 75. See id. 
 76. Meltem Izzetoglu et al., Functional Near-Infrared Neuroimaging, IEEE TRANSACTIONS 
ON NEURAL SYSTEMS REHABILITATION ENGINEERING 153, 156-58 (2005). 
 77. See Dean A. Pollina et al., Facial Skin Surface Temperature Changes During a 
“Concealed Information” Test, 34 ANNALS BIOMED. ENGINEERING 1182, 1183 (2006). 
 78. See Slaughter v. State, 105 P.3d 832, 835 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (“[W]e have no real 
evidence that Brain Fingerprinting has been extensively tested . . . .”). 
 79. See Yukiyasu Kamitani & Frank Tong, Decoding the Visual and Subjective Contents of 
the Human Brain, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 679, 679 (2005). 
 80. Michael S. Beauchamp, Functional MRI for Beginners, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 397, 
398 (2002) (reviewing RICHARD B. BUXTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC 
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information, but fails to remember it due to a head injury, for example, 
the EEG sensors will detect only the subject’s incomplete familiarity, 
producing a false negative.81  If, on the other hand, the targeted 
information is familiar to the subject for some reason other than its 
association with the crime, then a false positive result will follow.82  So 
if the subject happened to collect the same kind of gun as the murder 
weapon, or if he or she saw a representation of the crime scene on 
television, then these stimuli would indicate the subject’s familiarity 
with the information in question, even though this conclusion would be 
misleading.83 
In spite of these limitations, brain fingerprinting has been admitted 
into evidence in a 2003 criminal case, Iowa v. Harrington,84 which 
involved voluntary EEG testing in a post-conviction relief action.85  In 
1977, seventeen year-old Terry Harrington was found guilty of first-
degree murder in the shooting death of a retired police officer.86  
Harrington claimed he had spent the night in question at a concert with 
friends, several of whom confirmed his alibi at trial.87  But one witness, 
Kevin Hughes, testified that he and Harrington had driven to a 
dealership that night to steal a car, and that Harrington had shot and 
killed the retired officer who was working as a night watchman at the 
lot.88  A jury convicted Harrington and sentenced him to life in prison.89 
 
RESONANCE IMAGING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES (2002) and FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC 
RESONANCE IMAGING: AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS (Peter Jezzard et al. eds., 2001)). 
 81. See Tom Buller, Can We Scan for Truth in a Society of Liars?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 58, 59 
(2005). 
 82. See Fang Fang et al., Lie Detection with Contingent Negative Variation, 50 INT’L J. 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 247, 252-53 (2003); Kelly Joyce, Appealing Images: Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging and the Production of Authoritative Knowledge, 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 437, 450 (2005). 
 83. J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., Simple, Effective Countermeasures to P300-based Tests of 
Detection of Concealed Information, 41 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 205 (2004). 
 84. 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003). 
 85. See id. at 515. 
 86. See State v. Harrington, 284 N.W.2d 244, 245 (Iowa 1979). 
 87. See State v. Harrington, 659 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Iowa 2003); see also Lawrence A. 
Farwell, Supplement to Forensic Science Report: Brain Fingerprinting Test on Terry Harrington, 
Re: State of Iowa vs. Terry Harrington in the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County at 
Council Bluff, http://www.brainwavescience.com/HarringtonSupplement.php (last visited July 29, 
2008). 
 88. See Harrington, 284 N.W.2d at 248. 
 89. See id. at 245; see also Harrington v. State, 458 N.W.2d 874 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (initial 
post-conviction relief action); Harrington v. Nix, 983 F.2d 872, 874 (8th Cir.1993) (federal habeas 
relief action). 
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Twenty-three years later, forensic neuroscience gave Harrington 
another chance.90  In 2000, a trial judge admitted exculpatory EEG test 
results as grounds to open a post-conviction relief claim.91  After a day-
long hearing featuring three expert witnesses, Judge Ternus cited several 
patents92 and publications93 to conclude that the Brain Fingerprinting 
technique satisfied reliability standards for legal admissibility under 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.94  The neuroscientific expert 
in Harrington was Dr. Lawrence Farwell, the scientist who developed 
the EEG technique, and founder and chief scientist of Brain 
Fingerprinting Laboratories.95  First, Farwell conducted a test based on 
 
 90. See Andre A. Moenssens, Brain Fingerprinting—Can it be Used to Detect the Innocence 
of Persons Charged with a Crime?, 70 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 891, 916 (2002). 
 91. See Harrington v. Iowa, No. PCCV 073247 (Pottawattamie County D.C. Iowa, Nov. 14, 
2000).  See also Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 515-16 (citing Iowa Code § 822.2(4) (1999)).  Cf. U.S. 
v. Taveras, 570 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Confrontation rights and hearsay 
exclusions in practice are designed to protect defendants against inculpation, not to limit their use 
for exculpation.” (citing Dale A. Nance, Allocating the Risk of Error: Its Role in the Theory of 
Evidence Law, in 13 LEGAL THEORY 129, 157 (2007) (reviewing ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF 
EVIDENCE LAW (2005)) (“[A] defendant is entitled to adduce in his or her defen[s]e any evidence—
hearsay or non-hearsay—if that evidence is the best evidence available.”) (internal alterations 
omitted). 
 92. Method and Apparatus for Multifaceted Electroencephalographic Response Analysis 
(MERA), U.S. Patent No. 5,363,858 (filed May 5, 1993) (issued Nov. 15, 1994); Method and 
Apparatus for Truth Detection, U.S. Patent No. 5,406,956 (filed Feb. 11, 1993) (issued Apr. 18, 
1995); Method for Electroencephalographic Information Detection, U.S. Patent No. 5,467,777 (filed 
Sep. 15, 1994) (issued Nov. 21, 1995). 
 93. John J. Allen, William G. Iacono & Kurt D. Danielson, The Identification of Concealed 
Memories Using the Event-Related Potential & Implicit Behavioral Methods: A Methodology for 
Prediction in the Face of Individual Differences, 29 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 504 (1992); Lawrence A. 
Farwell & Emanuel Donchin, The Brain Detector: P300 in the Detection of Deception, 24 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 434 (1986); Lawrence A. Farwell et al., Optimal Digital Filters for Long-
Latency Components of the Event-Related Brain Potential, 30 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 306 (1993); 
Lawrence A. Farwell & Emanuel Donchin, Talking Off the Top of Your Head: Toward a Mental 
Prosthesis Utilizing Event-Related Brain Potentials, 70 ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY & CLINICAL 
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 510 (1988); Lawrence A. Farwell & Emanuel Donchin, The Truth Will Out: 
Interrogative Polygraphy (“Lie Detection”) with Event-Related Brain Potentials, 28 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 531 (1991); Lawrence A. Farwell, Two New Twists on the Truth Detector: 
Brain-Wave Detection of Occupational Information, 29 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 20 (1992); Lawrence 
A. Farwell, The Brain-Wave Information Detection (BID) System: A New Paradigm for 
Psychophysiological Detection of Information (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). 
 94. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  In addition to “general acceptability” by the relevant scientific 
community, Daubert standards require rigorous testing, published peer-review, and demonstration 
of an acceptably low rate of error.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583, 591-94; see also, Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (C.A.D.C. 1923) (discussing “general acceptability”); General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 95. See Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, http://www.brainwavescience.com (last visited 
July 29, 2008). 
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details about the crime scene that would be known only to the 
perpetrator and investigators.  The test concluded, with 99.9% 
confidence, that the information was absent from Harrington’s brain.96  
Then, Farwell tested unique details about the concert that Harrington 
claimed to have been at on the night of the murder for which he was 
convicted.97  The test found with similar confidence that the information 
was present.98 
While the EEG results were not dispositive in Harrington—the 
Iowa Supreme Court instead granted Harrington a new trial on the basis 
of a Brady violation99—when confronted with the test results, the single 
eyewitness, Kevin Hughes, recanted his testimony and confessed to 
perjuring himself at the original trial.100  Upon reversal and remand, the 
prosecution announced that it was dismissing the case on the grounds 
that the “admissible evidence which is left after 26 years is not sufficient 
to sustain a conviction against Mr. Harrington.”101  After 25 years in jail, 
Terry Harrington was freed.  It remains to be seen whether other state or 
federal courts will admit brain fingerprinting as evidence. 
Having reviewed some of the capacities and limitations of the two 
major classes of neurotechnology and focused attention on the class that 
measures brainwaves, we are in a position to see what makes 
neuroforensic techniques such as electroencephalography different from 
traditional lie-detection methods like the polygraph machine.  
Polygraphy measures the physiological reactions that follow from 
emotional responses.102 These reactions are thought to express 
themselves as detectable changes in the peripheral nervous system.103  
While the subject is being interviewed, therefore, the polygraph machine 
monitors changes in a subject’s perspiration (by attaching metal sensors 
to the fingers or palms), breathing rate (using rubber tubes wrapped 
around the chest), and blood pressure and heart rate (with an arm 
cuff).104  A problem with the polygraph is that a subject may be able to 
 
 96. See Farwell, supra note 87. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Iowa 2003). 
 100. Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Brain Fingerprinting Testing Helps to Exonerate Man 
Falsely Convicted of Murder, http://www.brainwavescience.com/HarringtonSummary.php (last 
visited July 29, 2008). 
 101. Mark Siebert, Free Man, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 25, 2003, at B8. 
 102. American Polygraph Association, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.polygraph.org/faq (last visited Aug. 20, 2008). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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control and learn to manipulate his or her emotional responses, and 
hence the physiological reactions that the machine is able to account 
for.105  Subjects have been able to “fool” the polygraph machine by 
using simple counter-measures like stressors, such as flexing muscles or 
placing tacks in a shoe, to induce or inflate physiological responses, or 
sedatives, such as barbiturates or minor tranquilizers, to depress the 
central nervous system and dampen stress reactions.106  That the 
polygraph is not immune to bluffing renders the test unreliable for 
purposes of lie-detection and truth-verification.107 
Neuroscientific forensic technology is not just high-tech 
polygraphy.  Unlike the polygraph test, which gauges a subject’s 
emotional response to the act of lying, brain imaging techniques 
ascertain the neurological processes required for a subject’s brain even 
to produce a lie.108  The application of cognitive neuroscience enables 
interrogators to sidestep the peripheral nervous system in order to gain 
direct access to the workings of the brain.109  Whereas the polygraph 
measures controllable physical manifestations of emotional tension, 
brain fingerprinting techniques measure involuntary brain activation.110  
 
 105. See American Psychological Association, The Truth About Lie Detectors (aka Polygraph 
Tests), PSYCHOL. MATTERS, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.psychologymatters.org/polygraphs.html; 
Susan McCarthy, Passing the Polygraph, SALON, Mar. 2, 2000, 
http://archive.salon.com/health/feature/2000/03/02/liedetection/index.html. 
 106. See Dan Eggen & Shankar Vedantam, Polygraph Results often in Question: CIA, FBI 
Defend Test’s Use in Probes, WASH. POST, May 1, 2006, at A1. 
 107. See American Polygraph Assoication, Polygraph Validity Research, 
http://www.polygraph.org/validity-research (last visited Aug. 20, 2008).  The American Polygraph 
Association (APA), which oversees scientific research and development, establishes methodologies 
and procedures, and maintains qualifying standards and licensing tests for all polygraph examiners 
in the United States, suggests that reliability rates for modern polygraph techniques approach 
ninety-two percent.  See id.  See also Concerns over Use of Polygraphs: Hearing Before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 5-8 (2001) (statement of Michael H. Capps, Deputy 
Director for Developmental Programs, Defense Security Service), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov (“There is common agreement in the scientific community that modern 
polygraph techniques do produce [results] usually in excess of 90% . . . this compares favorably 
with many other common techniques in the behavioral sciences.”). 
 108. Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUM. 
BRAIN MAPPING 157, 163 (2002). 
 109. G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 
13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 830 (2003) (noting that fMRI techniques make it possible to “examine 
directly the organ that produces lies, the brain”). 
 110. To the extent that fMRI, like polygraphy, requires the subject to speak his responses to 
external stimuli provided by the government, this type of neuroforensic technique is somewhat less 
interesting for purposes of Fifth Amendment inquiry, since spoken communications are generally 
protected under the privilege.  See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988) (“The vast 
majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial” because “[t]here are very few instances in 
which a verbal statement, either oral or written, will not convey information or assert facts.”). 
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The extra “work” that it requires for a subject’s brain to create a new 
memory occurs independent of stress levels, and cannot be effectively 
controlled.111  The primary cognitive processes that 
electroencephalography measures are thus far more difficult to 
dissimulate than the physical manifestation of secondary emotional 
responses that are measured by the polygraph.112  As one commentator 
puts it: “[E]ven a trained counter-spy must use creativity and calculation 
to formulate a new lie, and the most nervous Nellie will use memory to 
recount an event in her past.”113  Not only is intentionally bluffing the 
EEG machine not an option; neither is overriding memory detection 
unintentionally.  Brain fingerprinting can detect even good-faith 
mistaken responses, since the machine identifies the brain activity 
required to create the new memory, whether the lie was deliberate or 
inadvertent.114  Moreover, the use of non-human examiners renders 
neurotechnologies less vulnerable to test bias than polygraphy.115  
Polygraph tests are performed by human interrogation and interpreted by 
human examiners, whose behavior and judgment can affect test 
results.116  With EEG, by contrast, the subject is presented test questions 
on a computer screen and the analysis of brain activity is displayed in 
high-resolution imaging and performed using computer software.117  All 
this renders brain fingerprinting far more reliable, or at least potentially 
so, than traditional lie-detection techniques like polygraph testing. 
IV.  THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TESTIMONIAL AND PHYSICAL 
EVIDENCE 
Whether brain fingerprinting is privileged by right-to-silence 
jurisprudence turns on whether it counts as “testimonial” evidence, 
which is protected by the Fifth Amendment, or “physical” evidence, 
which is not.  There are three factors—compulsion, incrimination, and 
 
 111. See Lee et al., supra note 108, at 163 (“controlling one’s cerebral activity to avoid 
detection is unfeasible”). 
 112. See id. 
 113. Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility of FMRI Lie Detection: The Cultural Bias Against “Mind 
Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1355 (2007). 
 114. Judy Illes & Eric Racine, Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by 
Genetics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5, 9-10 (2005). 
 115. See Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence: Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 905 
(1998). 
 116. See id. (“The examiner’s role cannot be overstated, because it is the examiner who decides 
whether there is sufficient indication of deception.”). 
 117. Steve Silberman, Don’t Even Think About Lying: How Brain Scans are Reinventing the 
Science of Lie Detection, WIRED MAG., Jan. 2006, at 142. 
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testimony—that must be present to warrant constitutional scrutiny under 
the Fifth Amendment.118  The third factor—testimony—is where the 
action is.119  Courts have struggled to make sense of what counts as 
“testimonial” evidence in this “admittedly abstract and under-determined 
area of law.”120  This same challenge applies to forensic neuroscience.   
It is not difficult to imagine that brain fingerprinting would qualify 
as unambiguously compelled—in the sense that, “considering the totality 
of the circumstances, the free will of the [subject] was overborne”121—
and unambiguously incriminating—in the sense that it “could be used in 
a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so 
used.”122  What is less clear is whether EEG evidence would qualify as 
“testimonial.”123  The Supreme Court has held that a person is a 
“witness” against himself for purposes of the Fifth Amendment when he 
is “compelled to testify . . . or otherwise provide the State with evidence 
of a testimonial or communicative nature.”124  To count as testimonial, 
as opposed to physical, the communication must, “explicitly or 
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.”125 
The seminal case in the history of the physical/testimonial 
distinction came more than forty years ago, in Schmerber v. 
California.126  Schmerber presented the Supreme Court with the issue of 
whether the use of compelled blood tests to incriminate a defendant 
violated his constitutional right to silence.127  Armando Schmerber, after 
 
 118. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not 
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but 
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is 
incriminating.”).  In addition to the compulsion, incrimination, and testimony elements, a case must 
also arise under matter of criminal law for the privilege to apply.  See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 
760, 766-67 (2003).  So there is no Fifth Amendment protection when the compelled information 
would lead to exclusively non-criminal sanctions, such as the loss of a job or a license. 
 119. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762-63 (1966) (noting that “[h]istory and a long 
line of authorities in lower courts have consistently limited” the right to silence to situations 
involving compelled testimonial evidence). 
 120. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff’d, 530 U.S. 27 (2000); 
see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting) (“These words [testimonial and physical] 
are not models of clarity and precision as the Court’s rather labored explication shows.”). 
 121. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 
U.S. 534, 544 (1961)). 
 122. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 455 (1972). 
 123. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763-64. 
 124. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). 
 125. Id. 
 126. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 127. Id. at 758.  Schmerber also raised Due Process, Fourth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel claims.  The Court rejected each.  Id. at 759-72. 
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drinking at a local bowling alley, drove his car into a tree.128  While at 
the hospital receiving treatment for injuries sustained in the crash, 
Schmerber was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and 
instructed to submit to a blood test to determine his level of 
intoxication.129  When Schmerber refused, the arresting officer directed 
the attending doctor to withdraw a blood sample from his body even 
so.130  Laboratory analysis of Schmerber’s blood “indicated 
intoxication.”131  At trial, California prosecutors presented the results of 
Schmerber’s blood test, over his objections, as evidence that he had been 
driving drunk.132  Schmerber was convicted.133 
Schmerber appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing 
that the government’s use of the involuntary blood test to establish his 
guilt violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.134  The Supreme Court dismissed his claim.  In a five-to-
four decision, the Court held that the use of the blood test to convict 
Schmerber did not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause because that 
evidence, although it was obtained from Schmerber against his will, was 
properly characterized as “physical,” as opposed to “testimonial.”135  
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan explained that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege excluded “physical” evidence, such as 
fingerprints, handwriting exemplars, appearance in a lineup, or, as in the 
case before the Court, a blood sample.136  While Schmerber’s blood may 
“testify” to something, Louis Seidman explains, “it does so in a purely 
physical fashion without implicating his interior, mental life.”137  Justice 
Brennan affirmed that the right to silence is limited in scope to evidence 
like a written confession or verbal communication, which is actively 
“testimonial” in nature.138 
Writing in dissent, Justice Black rejected the distinction between 
physical and testimonial evidence on grounds of conceptual coherency 
 
 128. Id. at 758. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 759. 
 131. Id. at 757. 
 132. Id. at 758-59. 
 133. Id. at 757. 
 134. Id. at 758. 
 135. Id. at 765. 
 136. Id. at 765 (arguing that the blood test and its results did not involve “even a shadow of 
testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused”). 
 137. Louis M. Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law 
and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 131-32 (1996). 
 138. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. 
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and normative desirability.139  On the coherency objection, Justice Black 
argued that so-called physical evidence like a blood test is the functional 
equivalent of oral testimony, in the sense that both are extracted from the 
suspect himself and that both may be comparably persuasive to the jury 
that will determine the suspect’s verdict.140  The distinction between 
physical and testimonial evidence was therefore a distinction without 
difference in Justice Black’s view.  On the desirability objection, Justice 
Black remarked that “[i]t is a strange hierarchy of values that allows the 
State to extract a human being’s blood to convict him of a crime because 
of the blood’s content but proscribes compelled production of his lifeless 
papers.”141 
In defending the physical/testimonial distinction, Justice Brennan 
drew for support on John Henry Wigmore’s classical Evidence treatise142 
and on Justice Holmes’s opinion more than half a century earlier in Holt 
v. United States.143  Wigmore cited the case of Block v. People144 to 
argue that since “the public interest in obtaining [incriminating] 
evidence is usually sufficient to outweigh by a clear margin the private 
interests sacrificed in the process,” only testimonial compulsion was 
protected by the right to silence.145  Wigmore limited the bounds of 
“testimony” to those beliefs of the accused that have been extracted for 
government use: 
Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication—written, oral 
or otherwise—upon which reliance is to be placed as involving his 
consciousness of the facts and the operations of his mind in expressing 
it, the demand made upon him is not a testimonial one.146 
Fingerprinting, blood tests, and appearance in a lineup did not 
qualify as testimonial, Wigmore argued, because these forms of 
 
 139. Id. at 773 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 774. 
 141. Id. at 775.  “Lifeless papers” referred to the Court’s opinion in Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886), in which the Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments create a zone of 
privacy into which the government cannot intrude by using his books and papers as evidence against 
him in a criminal proceeding.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 621-22.  The holding in Boyd has since been 
rejected in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) and United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 
(1984). 
 142. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
 143. 218 U.S. 245 (1910). 
 144. 240 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1951).  “The purpose of the amendment against self-incrimination is 
to prevent a man from being compelled to utter words that will incriminate him, and not to 
obliterate all evidence of physical facts showing who and in what condition he is.” Id. at 516. 
 145. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 142, at § 2265. 
 146. Id. 
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evidence did not involve revelation of the suspect’s knowledge.147  Holt 
involved the appeal of a murder conviction on the ground, among others, 
that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was 
forced to try on an incriminating shirt to show that it fit him.148  Writing 
for the Court, Justice Holmes rejected the defendant’s claim as “an 
extravagant extension of the 5th Amendment.”149  He distinguished 
government compulsion as used, on the one hand, “to extort 
communications from [the defendant],” and, on the other hand, to use 
the defendant’s “body as evidence when it may be material.”150  Justice 
Holmes applied a reductio ad absurdum to argue that the right to silence 
does not protect against compelled evidence from the defendant’s 
body.151  To extend Fifth Amendment protection to such physical 
evidence would, “in principle[,] . . . forbid a jury to look at a prisoner 
and compare his features with a photograph in proof.”152  To avoid this 
implausible conclusion, Justice Holmes restricted the privilege against 
self-incrimination to “communications.”153 
In Schmerber, the Court applied this same distinction between 
“‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’”154 and “real or physical 
evidence.”155  Justice Brennan explained that whether evidence counts as 
physical or testimonial depends on whether the process by which the 
evidence was acquired or evaluated “implicated” the suspect’s 
“testimonial capacities.”156  The privilege applied to testimonial 
communications broadly, in “whatever form they might take,” whether 
word of mouth, written notes, or communicative body language such as 
pointing or nodding.157  The drawing of Schmerber’s blood, although 
both compelled and incriminating, did not involve his testimonial 
capacities and did not relate to other written or verbal communications 
by the defendant.158  The blood test therefore qualified as “physical” 
evidence, so it was not protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause.159 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Holt, 218 U.S. at 246, 252-53. 
 149. Id. at 252. 
 150. Id. at 252-53. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. at 253. 
 153. Id. at 252-53. 
 154. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 765. 
 157. Id. at 763-64. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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Justice Brennan reaffirmed the basic distinction between physical 
and testimonial evidence in the Court’s next term.  United States v. 
Wade160 involved a suspect accused of robbing a bank at gunpoint, 
disguised with “a small strip of tape on each side of his face.”161  Police 
later arrested him and placed in a line-up alongside him several other 
prisoners, each of whom “wore strips of tape such as allegedly worn by 
the robber,” and repeated the robber’s words: “put the money in the 
bag.”162  Witnesses to the robbery relied on the lineup to identify the 
suspect as the robber.  Rejecting the suspect’s Fifth Amendment claim, 
Justice Brennan wrote for the majority: 
We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his 
person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves 
no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial 
significance.  It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical 
characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might 
have.163 
Nor did forcing the suspect to “utter words purportedly uttered by 
the robber” constitute testimonial evidence, since his voice was used 
merely as “an identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his 
guilt.”164  Having found that neither forced appearance in the robber’s 
disguise nor forced vocalization of the phrase used during the robbery 
counted as testimonial, Justice Brennan concluded that evidence 
provided in the lineup was “not within the cover of the privilege.”165 
Justice Brennan reached the same result in applying the 
physical/testimonial distinction to the handwriting exemplar the suspect 
in Gilbert v. California166 provided to the state to compare against a 
handwritten robbery note demanding money from the Mutual Savings 
and Loan Association of Alhambra.167  Although a person’s “voice and 
handwriting are, of course, means of communication,” Justice Brennan 
conceded, “[i]t by no means follows . . . that every compulsion of an 
accused to use his voice or write compels a communication within the 
cover of the privilege.”168  Given that the “voice recordings were . . . 
 
 160. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 161. Id. at 218. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 222. 
 164. Id. at 219. 
 165. Id. at 224. 
 166. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
 167. Id. at 264. 
 168. Id. at 265. 
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used solely to measure the physical properties of the witnesses’ voices, 
[and] not for the testimonial or communicative content of what was to be 
said,”169 this mere exemplar, “like the voice or body itself, is an 
identifying physical characteristic outside its protection.”170  Exemplar 
cases do not qualify as testimonial because although the act of speaking 
specified words or signing one’s name or trying on certain clothes, 
without more, conveys comprehension of and response to a command, 
no substantive information is thereby communicated to the government.  
By 1967, the Self-Incrimination Clause excluded from its coverage 
appearance in a lineup or in certain clothes, and voice or handwriting 
exemplars.  These were not testimonial kinds of evidence, the Court 
said, and so were, like Schmerber’s blood test, beyond the purview of 
the Fifth Amendment. 
Returning to Schmerber, Justice Brennan noted that the “privilege 
[against self-incrimination] has never been given the full scope which 
the values it helps to protect suggest,”171 but ruminated on further 
extensions of the right to silence.  Speaking to circumstances that lay 
beyond the facts of the case, Justice Brennan addressed in dicta the 
question of whether the logic that makes compelled blood tests immune 
to the Fifth Amendment also applies to compelled polygraphs.172  Justice 
Brennan reasoned that even though a polygraph, like a blood test, 
measures physical processes, lie-detection may nevertheless count as 
testimonial because “[s]ome tests seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical 
evidence,’ for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body 
function during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting 
responses which are essentially testimonial.”173  Justice Brennan 
continued: “To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort 
will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of 
physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and 
history of the Fifth Amendment.”174  Were Justice Brennan’s musings 
the privilege central to the holding in Schmerber, those words would 
 
 169. Id. at 269. 
 170. Id. at 266. 
 171. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966). 
 172. Id. at 764. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (emphasis added).  Justice Brennan’s conclusion that involuntary lie detector evidence 
might be barred by the Self-Incrimination Clause is again consistent with Wigmore’s discussion of 
the physical/testimonial distinction.  Wigmore noted the difficulty in classifying the use of truth 
serums or polygraphs in cases where “not only is the person’s affirmative participation essential (at 
least in the form of physical responses) but his knowledge, despite his will to the contrary, is 
extracted.”  8 WIGMORE, supra note 142, at § 2265. 
23
Fox: The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
FOX 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
786 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:763 
presumably apply to protect a criminal suspect from the use of brain 
imaging to extract incriminating information from her brain, even as she 
exercised no control over the transmission of the information. 
In subsequent decades, however, the Court interpreted the 
physical/testimonial distinction as turning on whether the process of 
disclosing incriminating information bears testimonial qualities, as 
opposed to whether the product of that information is testimonial.175  For 
evidence to count as “testimonial” on this account, the process by which 
the government acquires information from the suspect must convey his 
active and intended transmission of internal knowledge about the outside 
world.  There are good reasons for emphasizing the process of evidence-
gathering over the product of information thereby revealed.  On Daniel 
Seidman and Alex Stein’s anti-pooling account of the privilege, for 
example, the lies of a guilty suspect should not be immune from moral 
or legal censure because, by masquerading as the truths of an innocent 
suspect, these lies compromise the credibility of all innocent suspects in 
defending themselves.176  Focusing on the process of evidentiary 
disclosure captures this ability of guilty suspects to manipulate 
incriminating information and thereby hurts the innocent by rendering 
their truthful appeals unreliable.177  Giving attention instead to the 
product of incriminating information would fail to capture this reliability 
element of compelled evidence that serves to help innocent suspects. 
On this understanding of the physical/testimonial distinction, the 
important fact in Schmerber is that the accused did not play a conscious 
or purposeful role in the transfer of incriminating information to the 
government, since he was an unwilling donor for bodily material that 
was examined by a chemical analysis likewise beyond his control.178  
Since Schmerber’s blood did not “belong” to him in the way that his 
thoughts do, Louis Seidman explains, sticking a needle in his arm 
deprived Schmerber of any intentional participation that could qualify 
his blood test as “testimonial.”179  The results of the blood test in 
Schmerber counted as physical evidence “not simply because the 
evidence concerned the suspect’s physical body,” the Court would later 
 
 175. See Allen & Mace, supra note 39, at 276.  But see H. Richard Uviller, Foreword: Fisher 
Goes on the Quintessential Fishing Expedition and Hubbell is Off the Hook, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 311, 320-21 (2001) (observing that derivative protection in United States v. Hubbell 
“comes perilously close to treating the contents of a document as the indirect product of its 
production”). 
 176. Seidman & Stein, supra note 30, at 453 n.79. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 475-76. 
 179. Seidman, supra note 137, at 131-32. 
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write, but also because of Schmerber’s passive role in providing the 
evidence.180  Schmerber’s progeny followed this process-based (as 
opposed to product-based) approach to defining testimonial evidence for 
purposes of the protection under the Fifth Amendment. 
The Court’s subpoena cases are instructive.  The Self-Incrimination 
Clause has been held to protect not the product, or informational 
content, of whatever is produced in response to the subpoena, but rather 
the process of providing a specified entity.  Compare the application of 
the physical/testimonial distinction when faced with a subpoena to 
produce known tax forms in Fisher v. United States,181 as opposed to a 
subpoena to produce underspecified documents in United States v. 
Hubbell.182  In Fisher, the privilege did not apply because the product of 
the subpoena papers was already known by the government, so the 
process by which the suspect disclosed the information involved an 
effectively mechanical and therefore non-testimonial response.183  In 
Hubbell, by contrast, the Court held that Fifth Amendment prevented the 
government’s request for documents whose existence was unknown and 
whose contents could not be described with any specificity.184  The 
privilege applied in Hubbell because providing the documents required 
the suspect’s active participation, and thereby made use of the “contents 
of his own mind.”185  Although the testimonial product was essentially 
identical to that in Fisher, because the existence and location of the 
documents were not a “foregone conclusion,”186 the testimonial process 
revealed to the government the suspect’s knowledge that the documents 
both existed and also were within his own possession.187  It was the 
process and not the product of subpoenaed information that made the 
evidence count as testimonial. 
The Court also took this approach in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, which 
involved a right to silence appeal to an answer to a question about the 
date of the defendant’s sixth birthday at a sobriety check.188  At a drunk 
driving stop, an officer asked Inocencio Muniz to perform “three 
standard field sobriety tests: a ‘horizontal gaze nystagmus’ test, a ‘walk 
 
 180. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 593 (1990). 
 181. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 182. 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
 183. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (acknowledging that “[t]he act of producing evidence in 
response to a subpoena . . . has communicative aspects of its own”). 
 184. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44-45. 
 185. Id. at 43. 
 186. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. 
 187. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44-45. 
 188. 496 U.S. 582, 587-88 (1990). 
25
Fox: The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
FOX 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
788 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:763 
and turn’ test, and a ‘one leg stand’ test.”189  Muniz failed all three.190  
He was arrested and driven to the police station, where the officer 
videotaped his slurred responses to questions including his “name, 
address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age.”191  
After “stumbling over his address and age,” Muniz was asked whether 
he knew “the date of [his] sixth birthday[.]”192  He replied, “No, I 
don’t.”193 
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan distinguished the physical 
qualities of Muniz’s slurred speech from the testimonial qualities of the 
sixth birthday question.194  The “slurred nature of his speech” involved 
Muniz’s “physical inability to articulate words in a clear manner due to 
‘the lack of muscular coordination of his tongue and mouth.’”195  The 
videotape evidence of the slurring, in isolation, constituted a physical 
process, which was “not itself testimonial.”196  By contrast, the sixth 
birthday question was testimonial because it required Muniz to make 
active use of his confused mental state.197  Inferring Muniz’s level of 
intoxication from his inability to answer a simple question turned on the 
process of his transmitting information about his drunkenness.  Or so 
Justice Brennan contended: 
The Commonwealth . . . argue[s] that this incriminating inference does 
not trigger the protections of the Fifth Amendment privilege because 
the inference concerns “the physiological functioning of [Muniz’s] 
brain,” . . . which is asserted to be every bit as “real or physical” as the 
physiological makeup of his blood and the timbre of his voice.  But 
this characterization addresses the wrong question; that the “fact” to be 
inferred might be said to concern the physical status of Muniz’s brain 
merely describes the way in which the inference is incriminating.  The 
correct question for present purposes is whether the incriminating 
inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial act or from 
physical evidence.198 
For evidence to count as “testimonial,” Justice Brennan argued, it 
was not enough for the accused simply to impart the information from 
 
 189. Id. at 585. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 585-86. 
 192. Id. at 586. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1990). 
 195. Id. at 590 (citation omitted). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 598-99. 
 198. Id. at 593. 
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his body or mind; he must also take an active and deliberate part in 
transferring that information to the government.  A “testimonial act” 
requires that the suspect exercise control over the transmission of 
information; mere submission to a state’s drawing out of information is 
not enough.199 
V.  THE MIND-BODY DISTINCTION IN FIFTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
How does the Court’s distinction between testimonial and physical 
evidence apply to the use of involuntary and incriminating neuroscience 
evidence in a criminal trial?  Consider the reflections of distinguished 
 
 199. In the next section, I challenge the jurisprudential distinction between testimonial and 
physical evidence.  I am not the first to do so.  Four scholarly critiques are prominent.  First, 
Richard Nagareda has argued that the physical/testimonial distinction is at odds with the historical 
understanding of what it means “to be a witness” under the Fifth Amendment, which he says is to 
produce compelled evidence, whether it is physical or testimonial in nature.  Richard A. Nagareda, 
Compulsion “to be a Witness” and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575, 1658-59 
(1999).  See also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-56 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
Second, Mike Redmayne has argued that “the most compelling rationale for the privilege is that it 
serves as a distancing mechanism, allowing defendants to disassociate themselves from 
prosecutions, [which] . . . suggests that no distinction should be drawn between requirements to 
speak and requirements to provide the authorities with documents, blood samples and the like.”  
Mike Redmayne, Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
209, 209 (2007).  Third, Susan Easton has argued that there are no principled grounds on the basis 
of which to distinguish the communicative qualities of evidence that the Court has classified as 
“physical” (e.g., bodily samples or markings like scars and tattoos) as opposed to “testimonial” 
(e.g., words or gestures intended to impart information).  SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT 
TO SILENCE, 217-18 (2d ed. 1998).  “[W]hile the distinction might be justified on grounds of policy 
or expediency,” Easton concludes, “nonetheless it is artificial and problematic, because both 
samples and speech are subject to similar considerations and arguments.”  Id. at 220.  Finally, 
Daniel Seidman and Alex Stein argue that “a suspect’s ability to tell uncontradicted lies can impose 
externalities because guilty suspects might harm innocent suspects by pooling with them through 
fabrications, lies, or omissions.”  Seidman & Stein, supra note 30, at 480; see also STEIN, supra 
note 91, at 158-64, 200-04.  The question for Seidman and Stein is not whether evidence is 
“physical” or “testimonial” in nature, but instead whether the evidence can be manipulated in a way 
that harms innocent defendants by making it possible for guilty defendants to pass off lies as truths, 
thereby rendering the latter less credible and less capable of protecting the innocent.  Id. at 476.  
Seidman and Stein argue that courts should replace the physical/testimonial distinction as a test for 
right-to-silence protection with a substitute distinction between externality-laden and externality-
free evidence, according to which “only the existence of a meaningful fabrication alternative should 
. . . activate the privilege.”  Id. at 480.  My account is different from these four accounts in two 
important respects.  First, I draw on evidence from cognitive neuroscience and metaphysical 
philosophy to challenge the very coherence of the physical/testimonial distinction.  I argue that the 
distinction takes for granted a conceptual division of mind from body that new research has exposed 
as false.  Second, my account is the only one that can explain why the Fifth Amendment should 
prohibit the compelled brain imaging technology to extort incriminating thoughts from an unwilling 
suspect. 
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jurist Hans A. Linde, former professor at the University of Oregon Law 
School and Associate Justice of Oregon Supreme Court from 1977 to 
1990.200  Writing in concurrence in the otherwise unremarkable case of 
State v. Lyon,201 which held that polygraph tests were inadmissible as 
evidence due to insufficient reliability,202 Justice Linde expressed his 
widely shared but difficult-to-articulate reluctance to embrace even 
demonstrably reliable polygraph evidence:203 
I doubt the uneasiness about electrical lie detectors would disappear 
even if they were refined to place their accuracy beyond question.  
Indeed, I would not be surprised if such a development would only 
heighten the sense of unease and the search for plausible legal 
objections.204 
Justice Linde said he would hesitate to admit into evidence any 
interrogation method, no matter how reliable, that purports to verify 
veracity in the thoughts of criminal suspects.205  Citing a pair of obscure 
1956 law review articles206 discussing a German case207 that denied 
admission of inculpatory polygraphy results on grounds of “personal 
dignity,”208 Justice Linde argued that polygraph testing threatened to 
undermine certain “fundamental tenets about human personhood.”209  
Justice Linde’s concern about personhood had two parts.  First, he 
 
 200. See generally INTELLECT AND CRAFT: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF HANS A. LINDE TO 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995); Symposium on the Work of Justice 
Hans Linde, 70 OR. L. REV. 679 (1991); Sanford Levinson, Tiers of Scrutiny—From Strict Through 
Rational Basis—and the Future of Interests: Commentary on Fiss and Linde, 55 ALB. L. REV. 745, 
746 (1992) (referring to Linde as “easily one of the three most important state court judges in this 
century”). 
 201. 744 P.2d 231 (Or. 1987). 
 202. See id. at 232. 
 203. Id. at 240 (Linde, J., concurring). 
 204. Id. at 238 (Linde, J., concurring). 
 205. Id. at 238.  See also Kittay, supra note 113, at 1390 (“[E]ven if fMRI technology could 
fully deliver on its potential, hopes of being welcomed in the courtroom are exceptionally 
hamstrung.”). 
 206. Henry J. Kaganiec, Lie Detector Tests and “Freedom of the Will” in Germany, 51 NW. U. 
L. REV. 446, 449 (1956) (arguing that coerced polygraph tests to “disclose the otherwise concealed 
psychic structure of the accused . . . are an . . . attempt to discover what might be present only in the 
unconscious of the accused”); Helen Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 683, 693 (1956) (arguing that concern about “human dignity” weigh against the 
admission of incriminating polygraph tests). 
 207. Lyon, 744 P.2d at 240 (Linde J., concurring); see 5 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, West Germany Supreme 
Court] (1954), cited in Silving, supra note 206, at 688-89, and Kaganiec, supra note 206, at 446. 
 208. Lyon, 744 P.2d at 240 (Linde J., concurring). 
 209. Id. 
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worried that admitting polygraph testing into the courtroom would 
compromise the performative character of criminal trials, which he 
regarded as a constitutive element “underlying our legal and social 
institutions.”210  I take my cue from his second argument that the use of 
polygraph testing threatened to reduce subjects to “electrochemical 
systems to be certified as truthful or mendacious by a machine.”211 
Justice Linde conceded that the “function of detecting a lie” among 
suspects and witnesses is undoubtedly a “valuable” one in the American 
criminal justice system,212 and that the polygraph is not altogether 
unique among interrogation techniques that seek to achieve this worthy 
objective by “turn[ing] its subject into an object.”213  But polygraph 
testing is different in kind, Justice Linde argued, because of the 
“[i]nconsistency of physiological lie detection with fundamental tenets 
about human personhood [that] has been important in European 
objections to the polygraph, reflecting Christian and Kantian 
philosophical traditions as much as doubts of its accuracy.”214  Though 
he did not elaborate as to what precisely those “tenets about human 
personhood” consisted of,215 Justice Linde overstated such concerns as 
they apply to polygraph testing,216 since polygraphy yields unreliable 
results that are vulnerable to manipulation by subjects, interrogators, and 
evaluators.217  Justice Brennan’s reflections on the use of involuntary 
 
 210. Id. at 240-41 (“The cherished courtroom drama of confrontation, oral testimony and cross 
examination is designed to let a jury pass judgment on [the] truthfulness [of witnesses] and on the 
accuracy of their testimony.”). 
 211. Id. at 240. 
 212. Id. at 239 (Linde, J. concurring) (“[T]he lie detector only purports to detect whether a 
person is uttering a lie,” which “[b]eyond doubt . . . is often a useful thing to know.”). 
 213. Id. (acknowledging that the basic relationship between the conclusions about truthfulness 
and the physiological facts that polygraph testing attempts to “independently establish” are similar 
in principle to accepted forensic techniques such as fingerprinting and blood testing for alcohol 
content levels). 
 214. State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 239-40 (Or. 1987). 
 215. See id. at 240.  For a compelling account of personhood applied to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, see Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom 
and the Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment Norm, 42 AKRON L. REV. 803 (forthcoming 
2009) (Part III.B). 
 216. See James R. McCall, The Personhood Argument Against Polygraph Evidence, Or “Even 
If the Polygraph Really Works, Will Courts Admit the Results?”, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 925, 941-43 
(1998). 
 217. As Department of Justice lawyer Michael R. Dreeben testified during oral argument in 
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), “[t]he fundamental unreliability of polygraph 
evidence is underscored . . . [by] the possibility that countermeasures can defeat any test.”  Oral 
Argument Transcript of Michael R. Dreeben on behalf of the Petitioner, available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1133/argument/.  See also Catherine M. 
Polizzi, A New View into the Truth: Impact of a Reliable Deception Detection Technology on the 
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testing to incriminate a criminal suspect extended beyond the facts of 
Schmerber’s blood testing.  Whatever application the “spirit and 
history”218 dicta might have had for forensic neuroscience, it is not 
binding precedent for any future cases.  Thus, Schmerber does not 
resolve whether brain fingerprinting is more like forms of evidence such 
as speaking, writing, and nodding, which are protected by the Fifth 
Amendment, or more like fingerprinting, breathalyzer tests, and 
handwriting samples, which are not protected. 
Whether the fitting analogy for neuroforensics is to traditionally 
“testimonial” evidence, or instead to traditionally “physical” evidence, is 
far from straightforward.219  Until recently, reliable information about a 
subject’s substantive knowledge required that a suspect actively 
communicate that information, whether by choosing to speak, write, or 
nod.  But now, forensic neuroscience enables law enforcement officials 
to access communicative phenomena in a way that leaves the suspect 
“no more control over the firing of neurons than Schmerber had in the 
way his blood responded to the test.”220  Once a suspect’s blood has been 
drawn, or EEG sensors affixed to his scalp, the results of the blood 
alcohol tests or lie-detection results are, for both, altogether involuntary.  
“[A]ny active participation on the part of the subject [of neuroscientific 
testing] would be, like Schmerber’s participation in the blood extraction 
and analysis, irrelevant to the results of the test.”221 
Brain imaging is difficult to classify because it promises distinctly 
testimonial-like information about the content of a person’s mind that is 
packaged in demonstrably physical-like form, either as blood flows in 
the case of fMRI, or as brainwaves in the case of EEG.222  Forensic 
neuroscience measures physiological changes in the brain—chemical 
reactions to an outside stimulus—that reveal communicative processes 
such as recall and deception.  When a subject is forced to undergo brain 
fingerprinting, the information that the test elicits is not precisely the 
 
Legal System, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 395, 398, 398 n.9 (1995) (“We are familiar 
with the polygraph, the most widely used and most controversial method of lie detection.”); 
Timothy B. Henseler, Comment, A Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in the 
Wake of Daubert: The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1997) (“The 
polygraph and other deception detection instruments have suffered through a tumultuous seventy 
years in the American legal system.”). 
 218. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
 219. Alexandra J. Roberts, Comment, Everything Old is New Again: Brain Fingerprinting and 
Evidentiary Analogy, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 234, 268 (2006). 
 220. Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 16, at 368-69. 
 221. Id. at 369. 
 222. See Haynes et al., supra note 56, at 324. 
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subject’s thoughts, at least in the way that we ordinarily tend to 
experience our thoughts as the deliberate transmission of ideas such as “I 
am familiar with the scene of the murder,” or “I recognize the murder 
weapon.”  In the India murder case, for example, the defendant Sharma 
did not speak, write, nod, or take any other active measure to 
communicate her thoughts in response to targeted stimuli.  Instead, EEG 
sensors detected patterns of electrical activity in her brain that 
corresponded to a physical code for her stored knowledge, the 
incriminating content of which was used to prosecute her for murder.   
What makes brain imaging unique, therefore, is not only “that the 
physical characteristics the scanner ‘observes’ are imperceptible to the 
average observer.”223  The more important reason that neuroscientific 
evidence is different is that it measures direct and involuntary brain 
activity that cannot, like polygraph testing, be effectively controlled by 
the subject undergoing interrogation.224  And because EEG and fMRI 
test results appear in the form of high-resolution computer-generated 
images, they are less likely than the polygraph to be misinterpreted by 
biased or imperfect evaluators.225 
What Justice Brennan failed to appreciate is that the distinction 
between physical and testimonial evidence presupposes a flawed 
dualism between body and mind.  The physical/testimonial distinction 
requires that exclusively mental (and not bodily) processes comprise 
communicative meaning.226  A division of mind and body therefore 
 
 223. Thompson, supra note 38, at 348. But see id. at 357. 
 224. See Lee et al., supra note 108, at 163 (“[C]ontrolling one’s cerebral activity to avoid 
detection is unfeasible.”). 
 225. See Giannelli, supra note 115, at 905 (“The examiner’s role cannot be overstated, because 
it is the examiner who decides whether there is sufficient indication of deception.”); Silberman, 
supra note 117, at 142. 
 226. Susan Easton suggests that the communicative meaning we attach to body language in 
itself reveals the conceptual bankruptcy of Cartesian dualism.  Easton states: 
[I]t is generally accepted that non-verbal gestures, whether voluntary, subconscious or 
involuntary, may communicate information, even where the individual does not “intend” 
that behavior . . . .  In everyday life people constantly look for visual clues and make 
judgments according to demeanor, or the shape or position of the body, and often treat 
them as better guides to mental attitudes than the spoken word. 
EASTON, supra note 199, at 217.  “While the distinction [between physical and testimonial 
evidence] might be justified on grounds of policy or expediency,” Easton concludes, “nonetheless it 
is artificial and problematic . . . .”  Id. at 220.  Easton concludes that the rigid physical/testimonial 
distinction should be replaced with a continuum that extends from oral communication at one end of 
the continuum; with body language (e.g., nodding) intended to communicate at the next point on the 
continuum; unintentional non-verbal communications (e.g., sweating) after that; followed by 
external bodily features (e.g., tattoos); then bodily materials voluntarily or involuntarily transmitted 
(e.g., blood or hair); and finally materials from a dead person (e.g., DNA) at the other end of the 
continuum.  See id. at 218. 
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underlies the doctrinal distinction between physical and testimonial 
evidence.  The so-called “mind-body problem is the problem of 
understanding how . . . the water of the physical brain is turned into the 
wine of consciousness.”227  Mind/body dualism conceives of the sphere 
of human psychology as distinct from the sphere of human biology.228  
The contemporary version of mind/body dualism was articulated by 
René Descartes.229  Following Plato and Aristotle’s speculations that the 
faculties of intellect or soul are distinct from the physical organism,230 
Descartes argued for a divorce of mind from body, distinguishing mental 
phenomena such as consciousness and self-awareness from material 
organs such as even the brain.231  On this account, the mind directs the 
body like a “ghost in the machine.”232 
Advances in cognitive imaging reveal the folly in the conceptual 
schism of mind and body.233  Neuroscientists agree that the complex 
phenomena of thought and behavior can be explained in terms of the 
neural activity of the brain.234  Recent research into the human nervous 
system has uncovered the existence of discernible correlates in our brain 
chemistry for what were once thought of as the purely philosophical and 
psychological, including thoughts, emotions, and behaviors like 
decision-making,235 free will,236 moral judgment,237 personality,238 
 
 227. Colin McGinn, Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?, 98 MIND 349, 349 (1989). 
 228. See W.D. Hart, Dualism, A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 265-67 (Samuel 
Guttenplan ed., 1996). 
 229. See Howard Robinson, Dualism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries 
/dualism/. 
 230. See, e.g., 1 PLATO, PLATONIS OPERA (E.A. Duke et al. eds., 1995); 2 ARISTOTLE, 
METAPHYSICS (METAPHYSICA) (W.D. Ross ed., 1924). 
 231. GORDON BAKER & KATHERINE J. MORRIS, DESCARTES’ DUALISM, (1996) (citing René 
Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), 2 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF 
DESCARTES 1-62 (John Cottingham et al. trans., 1984)). 
 232. BRENT GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF 
JUSTICE 66 (2004). 
 233. See Nemeroff et al., supra note 12, at 672 (“Neuroimaging offers a powerful probe of 
brain state, but we are now faced with metaphysical questions; i.e., what is a brain state, and how is 
it related to the outward manifestations of behavior?  This has the potential for degenerating into the 
old mind-body duality of Descartes . . . .”). 
 234. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775, 1775 (2004) (describing the 
very enterprise of cognitive neuroscience as the “understanding of the mind as brain”). 
 235. See, e.g., Lesley K. Fellows & Martha J. Farah, Different Underlying Impairments in 
Decision-making Following Ventormedial and Dorsolateral Frontal Lobe Damage in Humans, 15 
CEREB. CORTEX 58 (2005); Antonio R. Damasio, How the Brain Creates the Mind, SCI. AM., at 4 
(2002) (originally appearing in December 1999 issue). 
32
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/5
FOX 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
2009] THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AS PROTECTING MENTAL CONTROL 795 
consciousness,239 and the self.240  Among these neuroscientific insights is 
the discovery that even the most sophisticated operations of mind are 
deeply integrated with the mechanical operations of biological 
organisms.241  Brain imaging technologies can localize complex 
psychological and behavioral functions to specific neural regions 
through spatial and temporal resolution of functional markers in the 
brain.242 
That the mystery we associate with our thoughts and actions can be 
reduced to quantifiable networks of neural activity might be difficult to 
accept.243  In one sense, new insight into the neurological basis of 
behavior merely confirms what doctors suspected in 1848, when Phineas 
Gage, a Vermont railroad worker, had a thirteen-pound iron rod driven 
through his frontal lobe with such dramatic effects on his personality and 
behavior that his friends declared that “Gage was no longer Gage.”244  In 
another sense, research into the human nervous system significantly 
advances our understanding of and confidence in the synthesis between 
mind and body.245  Neuroimaging studies provide strong evidence that 
there is no freestanding metaphysical being that tells our brains what to 
 
 236. See, e.g., Rudolph Friedrich Wagner & Hans Reinecker, Problems and Solutions: Two 
Concepts of Mankind in Cognitive–Behavior Therapy, 57 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 401 (2003). 
 237. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in 
Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001); Jorge Moll et al., Functional Networks in Emotional 
Moral and Nonmoral Social Judgments 16 NEUROIMAGE 696 (2002). 
 238. See, e.g., Turhan Canli & Zenab Amin, Neuroimaging of Emotion and Personality: 
Scientific Evidence and Ethical Considerations, 50 BRAIN COGNITION 414 (2002). 
 239. See, e.g., Giulio Tononi & Gerald M. Edelman, Schizophrenia and the Mechanisms of 
Conscious Integration, 31 BRAIN RES. REV. 391 (2000). 
 240. See, e.g., Seth J. Gillihan, & Martha J. Farah, Is Self Special? A Critical Review of 
Evidence from Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 76 
(2005). 
 241. See Damasio, supra note 235, at 9 (“[B]y 2050, sufficient knowledge of biological 
phenomena will have wiped out the traditional dualistic separations of body/brain, body/mind, and 
brain/mind.”). 
 242. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991). 
 243. See Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 16, at 369 (“[O]ur everyday conception of humanity still 
reflects dualistic notions of body and non-physical mind or soul”).  “Perhaps we think our minds are 
too opaque to ever be laid bare by a machine,” another commentator speculates, “or perhaps we so 
desperately cling to this last frontier of privacy that we are willing it to be impossible.”  Kittay, 
supra note 113, at 1394. 
 244. MALCOLM MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME: STORIES OF PHINEAS GAGE 11-13 
(2000); JOHN FLEISCHMAN, PHINEAS GAGE: A GRUESOME BUT TRUE STORY ABOUT BRAIN 
SCIENCE 2 (2004); Malcolm Macmillan, A Wonderful Journey through Skull and Brains: The 
Travels of Mr. Gage’s Tamping Iron, 5 BRAIN & COGNITION 67, 85 (1986). 
 245. STEVEN R. QUARTZ & TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, LIARS, LOVERS, AND HEROES: WHAT 
NEW BRAIN SCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT HOW WE BECOME WHO WE ARE 138-41 (2002). 
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think and do.246  Instead, the mind is intimately bound up with the whole 
of the human organism, while the organism works together with both 
body and brain.  This neuroscientifically informed picture of the 
integrated body and mind powerfully undermines the dualistic premise 
upon which the physical/testimonial distinction is built. 
Recognizing the incoherence of mind/body dualism prompts us to 
acknowledge that what we really care about is the individual’s control 
over his thoughts.  The relevant difference between a person’s thoughts 
and his blood is neither that his thoughts communicate information that 
his blood does not, nor that thinking requires the use of communicative 
processes that bleeding does not.  The relevant difference is instead that 
our blood is readily separable from what we think important about us, 
whereas our thoughts are not.247  Conventional forms of criminal 
evidence can disclose all sorts of personal and private information about 
me—where I was, what I did, or why I did it.  But when the state seizes 
my photographs, handwriting samples, or DNA, it does not deprive me 
of control over my mental life.  It does not, that is, compromise my 
ability to be in command of the use and disclosure of my thoughts.  
Compelled brain imaging, by contrast, does compromise this ability.  
The notion of mental control has normative significance because our 
thoughts are what anchor each of us as an individual person with an 
uninterrupted autobiographical narrative.248  It is not just that physical 
manifestations of brain function correspond to the exercise of subjective 
awareness; it is, moreover, that those neural transmissions are, as the 
organ of mind and consciousness, what we tend to think of as most 
 
 246. See studies discussed in ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, 
AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 24-30, 258-60 (2005). 
 247. Neuroscientist Donald Kennedy, editor of the journal Science, suggests that he seeks to 
keep his “brainome” private because “[i]t is way too close to who I am.”  Major Talks on Addiction, 
Neuroethics, and Depression Highlight Neuroscience 2003, NEUROSCIENCE Q. (Winter 2004), 
http://web.sfn.org/index.cfm?pagename=neuroscienceQuarterly_04winter_neuroscience; New York 
City Bar Association, Report from the Committee on Science and Law, Are Your Thoughts Your 
Own? ‘Neuroprivacy’ and the Legal Implications of Brain Imaging (2005), 
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/Neuroprivacy-revisions.pdf (citing Harrington v. Iowa, 659 
N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003)). 
 248. Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio refers to these features of selfhood as “the individuality 
and continuity of a living organism.”  Antonio R. Damasio, Mental Self: The Person Within, 423 
NATURE 227, 229 (2003). See also Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A 
Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 470 (2007) (exploring the “possibility 
that fMRI will reveal back to the individual . . . stories that are inconsistent with the individual’s 
dominant life narrative”). 
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important about who we are.249  At the core, that is, we think of 
ourselves as beings capable of self-reflection.  The Fifth Amendment 
protects a suspect’s control over his thoughts from unwanted 
government access and use.250 
 
 249. See GARLAND, supra note 232, at 34; see also HENRY T. GREELY, NEUROETHICS AND 
ELSI: SOME COMPARISONS AND CONSIDERATIONS (2004), http://perpich.com/neuroed/archive 
/139.pdf. Greely states: 
[I] am more than my genes.  The genes are an important part of me, but I can be certain 
that they are not my essence; they are not my soul.  When we shift that notion to the 
neuroscience area, though, I am not so confident.  Is my consciousness—is my brain—
me?  I am tempted to think it is. 
Id. 
 250. The notion of protecting the individual’s control over the use of his thoughts is not 
altogether foreign to Supreme Court reflections on the constitutional right to silence.  In United 
States v. Nobles, the majority wrote that the Fifth Amendment prohibits “state intrusion to extract 
self-condemnation” by “protect[ing] a ‘private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought.’”  
422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)); see also 
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 126 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Physical acts will 
constitute testimony if they probe the state of mind, memory, perception, or cognition of the 
witness.”).  Professor Richard Uviller also argued as early as 1987 that “personal control over the 
production of cognitive evidence, free of official coercion, is guaranteed by the self-incrimination 
clause of the fifth amendment.”  See H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal 
Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 
1137 (1987).  In light of Hubbell’s language emphasizing protection of the “contents of [a 
suspect’s] own mind,” United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000), Professor Uviller took 
Justice Brennan’s opinion in Schmerber to mean that “no one can be forced to divulge cerebral 
evidence, to speak the contents and products of the mind.”  Uviller, supra note 175, at 313.  Ronald 
Allen and Kristin Mace have since built on Uviller’s insights to argue that the privilege applies to 
“the substantive content of cognition,” which they define as “the intellectual processes of acquiring, 
storing, retrieving, and using knowledge . . . that allow one to gain and make use of substantive 
knowledge and to compare one’s ‘inner world’ (previous knowledge) with the ‘outside world’ 
(stimuli such as questions from an interrogator).”  Allen & Mace, supra note 39, at 246-47.  Allen 
and Mace suggest that the Court has implicitly taken “testimony” to mean “substantive cognition,” 
that is, the “contents of [one’s] own mind,” or “thoughts” that “result in holding or asserting 
propositions with truth value,” for example, that a person was present at the scene of a crime, or 
that he recognizes the victim, or took part in the act in question.  See id. at 266-67, 267 n.107 
(citing Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988)) (quoting Couch v. United States, 
409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)); United States v. 
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (also quoting Doe II and Curcio); see also Braswell v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 99, 126 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  In proscribing the compulsion of 
incriminating “testimony,” they argue, the Court is actually saying that state action cannot compel 
the revelation of these sorts of thoughts from the criminal suspect.  Allen & Mace, supra note 39, at 
266-67.  On this account, the right to silence guarantees “that the government may not compel 
revelation of the incriminating substantive results of compelled cognition.”  Id. at 268. 
However, Allen and Mace define protected cognition too narrowly.  See id. at 266-67, 267 n.107.  
Because their theory of “compelled cognition” incorporates the narrow precedential focus on those 
“propositions with truth-value” that are prompted by state action, id. at 268, their account would 
deny Fifth Amendment protection in a hypothetical case in which police reliably scanned a 
suspect’s mind for incriminating thoughts, provided that state officials did nothing to provoke or 
induce those thoughts, such as posing a question, or presenting the suspect with an image or 
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At least three objections may be raised against this account of the 
right to silence.  The first objection is that advances in forensic 
neurotechnology could shift the landscape of moral perceptions to 
eliminate the mismatch I identified between existing right-to-silence 
rationales and intuitions about the privilege’s application to brain 
imaging techniques.  This objection underestimates the human faculty of 
impulse and imagination.  Recall the Indian murder case, in which police 
were able to use brain imaging techniques to extort incriminating 
thoughts from the unwilling suspect.  This vision is not so different, and 
less radical in fact, than similar possibilities portrayed in contemporary 
film and literature such as George Orwell’s 1984251 and Steven 
Spielberg’s Minority Report.252  Popular media prompt us to reflect on or 
at least acknowledge the possibility of mind-reading devices and of 
government access to the thoughts of individuals.  The premise of the 
Indian case should not, therefore, be so unfamiliar to most people that 
their present intuitions could not be taken as a reliable guide to their 
intuitions in a world in which such technologies were no longer 
imagined, but real, and their use by police interrogators were no longer 
impossible but routine.  If present intuitions are a reliable guide, any 
divergence with existing principles is unlikely to disappear if the 
hypothetical were to become reality. 
The second objection is that protection of a suspect’s control over 
his thoughts cannot explain why the state can compel even confessions 
that are self-incriminating with a grant of immunity,253 or why the 
privilege traditionally applies only to incriminating evidence or to self-
incriminating evidence.254  The immunity exception is overstated, 
 
recording that was relevant to the victim or crime scene.  See William Federspiel, Comment, 1984 
Arrives: Thought(crime), Technology, and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 865, 
896-97 (2008).  Michael Pardo tries to resolve the gaps left by Allen and Mace to argue that the 
Self Incrimination Clause “appl[ies] when the government compels the tests in order to obtain 
evidence of the incriminating informational content of subjects’ propositional attitudes,” including 
“inductive evidence of their beliefs, knowledge, and other mental states.”  Pardo, supra note 35, at 
331-32.  But Pardo’s account of the Fifth Amendment suffers from similar limitations.  He 
concedes that his version of the privilege “would not preclude compelled tests when used for any 
purpose other than those that rely on incriminating propositional content.  For example, if the tests 
could be used to determine mental capacity, intent, bias, voluntariness, etc., without relying on 
incriminating propositional content, then the privilege would not preclude such uses.”  Id. at 332 
n.205. 
 251. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). 
 252. MINORITY REPORT (DreamWorks 2002). 
 253. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445-47 (1972). 
 254. See Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1232-34 (“The privilege applies only to testimony that is 
incriminating.”). 
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/5
FOX 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
2009] THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AS PROTECTING MENTAL CONTROL 799 
however, since “use immunity” applies narrowly to the act of production 
only.255  While subpoenaed documents are not protected from 
government use under 18 U.S.C. §6002, the state cannot use whatever 
information is obtained from that act of production, whether directly or 
indirectly, to criminally prosecute the suspect.256  The second point is 
that compelled evidence has not traditionally been protected under the 
Fifth Amendment unless it counts as both incriminating—in the sense 
that it could “furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to 
prosecute”257—and also self-incriminating—in the sense that the 
information is sought to incriminate the subject himself, as opposed to 
someone else, even family or friends.258  This restraint on the privilege 
implies that, provided prosecutors did not use the information derived 
from compelled brain imaging, either directly or indirectly, as evidence 
against the suspect himself in a criminal proceeding, then the Fifth 
Amendment would not prohibit the state from gaining unwanted access 
to his mental life.   
I reply by proposing that judges refine these limits on the right to 
silence, as they apply to state action that would deny a suspect control 
over the use of her thoughts.  Whether in the course of interrogation,259 
trial,260 or sentencing,261 when state officials seek to acquire information 
that would deprive individuals of control over their thoughts, then 
traditional limitations on the privilege against self-incrimination should 
not apply.  This exception is sufficiently narrow in scope and modest in 
practice and does not, however, change what it means for a person “to be 
a witness against himself.”262 
 
 255. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994). 
 256. Exceptions to this rule include prosecution for perjury, for giving a false statement, or for 
failing to comply with the subpoena order.  See id. 
 257. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 190 (2004) 
(quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)). 
 258. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956). 
 259. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (upholding a constitutional due process right to 
remain silent after arrest without later penalty); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(holding that the Fifth Amendment requires that a suspect be warned of his right to silence before 
any custodial interrogation). 
 260. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
prosecutors and judges from commenting adversely on a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal 
proceeding). 
 261. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321, 330 (1999) (extending application of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to criminal sentencing 
proceedings). 
 262. U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
37
Fox: The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
FOX 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
800 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:763 
The third objection is that concerns about mental control, even if 
valid, should not take moral priority over the social goals of criminal 
justice, including the punishment of the guilty and the prevention of 
crime.263  “There is nothing intrinsic in privacy and other individualist 
values,” some Fifth Amendment scholars have argued, “that should 
allow them to trump such objectives of the criminal justice system as 
deterrence and retribution.”264  Yet much in modern political theory has 
devoted itself to the proposition that each person possesses rights over 
which considerations of the common good cannot take precedence.  
Respect for the individual, this way of thinking goes, lies in conceiving 
of her both analytically as more than just one among a collective, whose 
group interests may not be fused together into a single sum total; and 
also normatively as an end in herself, who may not be used exclusively 
for purposes incompatible with her own.265  What John Rawls referred to 
as “the plurality and distinctness of individuals,”266 and Robert Nozick 
as “the fact of our separate existences,”267 demands deference to certain 
liberties that even the well-being of society as a whole cannot override.  
Worthy and serious though the goals of the criminal justice system are, 
they fail to outweigh the injury to the individual that is done when the 
state deprives a suspect of control over his mental life. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The law provides principles to guide research and technology of the 
human brain; so too can advances in cognitive neuroscience shape and 
inform the law.268   
Emerging brain imaging technology forces us to reckon with the 
prospect of evidence-gathering techniques that would enable the state to 
extract information directly from a suspect’s brain, in a way that affords 
her no opportunity for control over the transmission of that information.  
In so doing, forensic neuroscience reveals a tension between existing 
accounts of the right to silence and the plausible idea that individuals 
have a right of control over their thoughts from unwanted extraction or 
use by the government.  Some scholars have tried to resolve this tension 
 
 263. See Seidman & Stein, supra note 30, at 455. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 62 (1999). 
 266. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 26 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 267. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974). 
 268. See Adina Roskies, A Case Study of Neuroethics: The Nature of Moral Judgment, in 
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 17, 18 (Judy Illes ed., 
2006). 
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by comparing brain imaging to more familiar types of criminal evidence.  
They argue that if we set aside reliability concerns, then whatever 
suspicion with which we might greet the introduction of neuroscience to 
the courtroom is in principle indistinguishable from misguided resistance 
to forensic advances of the past such as DNA, X-rays, and 
photography.269  Yet this analogical approach is incomplete.   
That we balk at the prospect of reliable brain imaging, ostensibly 
similar though it appears to accepted forms of evidence, suggests that the 
dominant right-to-silence framework—with its arguments about 
reliability, excuse, and psychological cruelty—cannot capture the values 
at stake in matters of involuntary lie-detection.  The physical/testimonial 
distinction underlying self-incrimination doctrine is unlikely to protect a 
criminal suspect from the compelled use of fMRI or EEG.  Yet this key 
distinction presupposes a flawed conception of mind/body dualism.  
Brain imaging techniques that deprive individuals of control over their 
thoughts violate the “spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.”270 
 
 269. See Pardo, supra note 35, at 311 (“Photography, it was thought, potentially could usurp 
the power of courts to determine facts by shifting power to photography experts, and away from 
courts, to determine the true nature of reality.  None of this happened, of course, because the 
evidence was eventually assimilated . . . .”). 
 270. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. 
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